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Traditionally, American federalism has been defined by the qualifier 
"dual" before 1937, and "cooperative" after the famous "court-packing 
plan" of that year. However, over the last twenty-five years it has become 
increasingly common to speak of "regulated" or "regulatory" feder-
ali sm.1 What is implied in this term is the practice which was initiated in 
the budgetary field by the federal government in the 1960s of providing 
so-called "categorical grants-in-aid" with "strings attached" to the states, 
thus compelling the latter to implement federal regulations, especially in 
the fields of civil rights, poverty programs, and environmental regulation. 
These grants were channeled into specifically designated areas in con-
I. Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government, brief 7'" ed. (New York: W.W: 
Norton & Co., 2002) 61-62. For n special ized guud early analysis or this topic, see Donald F. Kelli. The Reg11-
latio11 of J\merican Fedel'lllism ( 198'.l; Balli more: Johns Hopkins University Prc.'s, 1987) 33-4 1. For a thor-
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Devolutio11: Twe111y-jive Years of /11tergovemme11ta/ R~form (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Prc.,s, 
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trast to "block grants," which left far more to the discretion of state and 
local governrnents.2 
President Lyndon B. Johnson launched the phrase "creative feder-
alism" to describe the mid-1960s' variant of federalism, which was char-
acterized by an expansive, activist federal government. President Nixon, 
in his first term in lhe White House, introduced the term "new feder-
alism" in connection with his administration's "revenue sharing" policy, 
allegedly seeking to reduce federal "coercion" by allocating monies to 
the states as lump sums. However, it was President Reagan who made the 
term a household word in the 1980s, using it in his attempt to decentralize 
several programs, for instance in the area of welfare. These efforts were 
only moderately successful , because a divided and generally hostile 
Congress resisted most of his strategic moves in this area. 
In contrast, after the Republicans assumed control of both chambers of 
Congress after the 1994 elections, the ideas implied in the concept "new 
federalism" enjoyed a totally different reception. Scali ng back federal 
power was among the top items of Speaker Newt Gingrich's revolu-
tionary program, "Contract with America." The debates over "unfunded 
mandates" and the resulting legislation rest1icting this practice were 
indicati ve of the novel spiri t on Capitol Hill. 3 This "devolutionary" 
impetus was part of the conservative campaign against Big Government 
in general - and the federal branch, the "Beltway crowd," in particular -
and was primarily critical of welfare spending (Medicaid being by far the 
most costly unfunded mandate) and expansive federal budgets in many 
fields. 
A similar trend toward decentralization or devolution can be detected 
in the federal courts, including the U.S . Supreme Court, which in fact 
slarled this move at an earlier point in time than Congress. Ag<iin this 
meant a radical break with the recent past, as for nearly forty years after 
its famous "switch" in l 937, the Supreme Court had not invalidated a 
2. In 1992, "categorical grants" made up 90.4% of federal transfers to the states, whereas "block grants" 
amounted to 8.3%, and "general purpose grants" made up a mere 1.4%. Milton C. Cummings and David Wisc, 
Democracy under Pressure: An lntrod11ctio11 to the American Political System, 71• ed. (New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1993) 79. 
3. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 was the keystone in this drive, outlawing the prncticc of 
the federal government of designi ng expensive programs for the states to implement, but provitling only a por-
ti on of the fu nding. 
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single piece of congressional regulation which was based on the Com-
merce Clause.4 This essay will analyze the U.S. Supreme Court's han-
dling of the federal question under the leadership of Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist, while also looking at some cases before the Court 
during the reign of his predecessor, Warren Earl Burger. It will do so by 
offering a close textual reading of Court opinions - majority, concurrent, 
and dissenting - in order to track the development of arguments under-
pinning or opposing this ideological paradigm shift in the Court's line of 
ruling. My analysis will rely mainly on my own interpretation of the 
Court record. My references to the evolving literature in the field will be 
limited, out of space consideration, but also because the present article is 
not meant to be an exhaustive treatise on the subject but rather a supple-
ment to certain vital areas of recent scholarship in the fi eld by offering an 
interpretation based on le mot Juste - the Court's opinions at their nitty-
gritty face value, often neglected in current w1iting on the Court - to 
reflect consistencies and detect inconsistencies in the justices' contribu-
tions to the evolving jw·isprudence of federalism in the High Court.5 
The New Deal "revolution" in the Supreme Court in this respect 
started with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), in which the 
Court approved of federal regulation of the workplace, but it was the 
Court decision in United States v. Darby (1941)- upholding the authority 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to impose minimum wage 
requirements on the lumbering industry engaged in interstate commerce 
- that provided the categorical stamp of the Court in this area . It was in 
his opinion for a unanimous Court in Darby that Associate Justice Harlan 
F. Stone included this famous statement pertaining to the Tenth Amend-
ment: "The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has 
not been surrendered."6 
4 . Art. T o f che U.S. Consti tut ion defines the make-up and powers of Congress. The "Commerce C lause" 
(Art. I, 8) reads: ''To regulate Conrn1erce with fore ign Nations, and amo ng the several States. and with the 
Indian T ribes." Typically, in che 1980s most standard constitutional law textbooks devoted about 15% co the 
issue or federali sm, whereas forty years earl ier the percentage had been 48%, according to one source. David 
Engdahl, Co11s1i1111io11al Federalism, Nucshe ll Series (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1987) 3. 
5. T have been surprised by the lack o r accuracy in interpretat io ns of and references to Court records in 
some articles and books written by reputed legal scho lars, which I feel fun her j ustifies my closely text-based 
approach. 
6. 3 12 U.S . 100, 124 (I 94 1 ). W hereas the first nine A mendments to the U.S. Constitution contained in the 
Bill of Rights list individual rights against government overreach, the 10th Amendment represents a protection 
of the states against overreach by the federal governmen t: "The po wers not delegated to the United States by 
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Although the issue was raised in court severa1 times during the next 
decades - primarily by state governments - the Court's Darby stance was 
firmly upheld by a solid majority of the Court. However, in Republican 
circles and in the South the question was not forgotten. For instance, in 
1962 presidential hopeful Nelson Rockefeller characterized the "death of 
federalism" as "highly exaggerated." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
held on to its firm line, and the reputable conservative constitutional 
scholar Philip Kurland took issue with Rockefeller 's statement explicitly, 
stating flatly in his 1969 Cooley Lecture at the University of Michigan: 
"Federalism is dead. "7 
Changing the Tide 
However, in the mid-seventies a minor revolution seemed to occur in this 
area of adjudication. An early indication that the Tenth Amendment was 
long in dying was given in the Court's ruling in Oregon v. Mitchell 
(1970), in which a coalition of five justices held that Congress had 
authority to establish eighteen as the voting age in federal elections by 
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, whereas it lacked power to 
set such a requirement for state elections due to the clear demands of the 
Tenth Amendment.8 Justice Hugo Black provided the vital fifth vote for 
the latter holding, announcing the maj01ity opinion of the Court. 
Observing that "the power granted to Congress was not intended to strip 
the States of their power to govern themselves," he contended that such a 
situation would "convert our national government of enumerated powers 
the Consti tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
Typically, in the 1980s most standanl consti tutional law textbooks devoted about 15% to Lhc issue of federa-
lism, whereas forty years earlier the percentage had been 48%, according to one source. David Engdahl, Com-
titutirmal Federalism, Nutshell Series (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1987) 3. 
7. Laurence Tribe, American Co11stirutio11al Law (Minneola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1988) 20, 
n. 9. Thomas Mcintyre Cooley ( 1824-1 898), the first Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, is 
best known for his Treatise 011 the Co11stillltio11al Limitations Which Rest 11po11 the l egislatil'e Po111er uf the 
States ( 1868) and for advocating Lhe near total freedom of the judicial branch from legislative interference. 
8. 400 U.S. 11 2 ( 1970). Some case references below will be to Findlaw's web version 
(http://easelaw.lp.rindlaw.com.). At this site, dissents are independently paginated, and wi ll be refen-ed to by 
the dissenter 's name and page number, later by page number only, names being included when needed for cla-
rity. 
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into a central government of umestrained authority over every inch of the 
whole Nation" (128). 
By the time the Court revisited the issue of minimum wages under the 
Fair Labor Standards Act in 1976, three new Justices had been added to 
the Court: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1972), William H. Rehnquist (1972), and 
John Paul Stevens (1975). In National League of Cities v. Use1y (1976), 
the Nixon appointee Justice Rehnquist was able to marshal a 5-4 Court 
majority (Burger, Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun) for a novel view of the 
powers of the federal government in this area.9 The FLSA had been 
amended in 1974 (the latest in a series of amendments) to extend the 
Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to almost all 
employees of states and their political subdivisions. 
The chief bone of contention was the gradual expansion by Congress 
of the Act's reach, a process having taken place by stages - in 1961, 
1966, and 1974 respectively - the final one removing, according to Jus-
tice William H. Rehnquist, the exemption previously granted states and 
their political subdivisions, thereby weakening the Act as a protector of a 
state prerogative (ibid.). In 1968, in Ma1yland v. Wirtz, the Court had 
upheld the Act against a challenge by 28 states and a school district 
against the 1961 and 1966 expansions of the FLSA, which among other 
provisions included state-operated hospitals and schools in the "enter-
prise concept." 10 
Similarly, in Fry v. United States (1975), the Court - with only Justice 
Rehnquist dissenting and Justice Douglas voting to dismiss the case -
had upheld The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. In so doing, the 
Court had accepted the conclusion of Congress in passing the bill that 
"unrestrained wage increases, even for employees of wholly intrastate 
operations, could have a significant effect on commerce." 11 The Court 
had concluded that the Act was constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause and that "under the Supremacy Clause the State must yield to the 
federal mandate" (ibid.). In Wirtz, the Court had leaned heavily on the 
following dicta in United States v. California ( 1936): 
9. 426 U.S. 833 (1 976). 
10. 392 U.S. 183 ( 1968). The decision was drafted by Justice John Marshall Harlan, whereas Justices Wil-
liam 0. Douglas and Potter Stewart d issented and Justice Marshall took no part in the case. 
11. 421 U.S. 542. 548 ( l 975). 
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IWeJ look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking the 
boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such limita-
tion upon the plenary power to regulate conunercc. The states can no more deny lhe 
power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual. (854) 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, Rehnquist labeled this statement 
"simply wrong" and stated bluntly that Wirtz must be overruled. The 
decisive fifth vote for the majority opinion in National League, written 
by the Rehnquist, was provided by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, who was 
to become a central actor in this area of adjudication in the next dozen 
years . In his brief concurring opinion, Blackmun admitted that he was 
"not untroubled by certain possible implications of the Court's opinion," 
but considered the plurality opinion which he joined "a balancing 
approach," finding comfort in his conviction that the decision did not 
preclude federal regulation in fields such as environmental protection, 
hedging his bet by adding: "With this understanding on my part of the 
Court's opinion, I join it" (856). 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. , wrote a stinging dissent, joined by Jus-
tices White and Marshall, in which he found it 
surprising that my Brethren should choose this bicentennial year of our independence 
to repudiate principles governing judicial interpretation of our Constitution settled 
since the time of Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall, discarding the postulate that the 
Constitution contemplates the restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary com-
merce power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process. For 152 years 
ago Mr. Chief Justice Marshall enunciated that principle to which, until today, his suc-
cessors on this Court have been faithful. (857) 
National League of Cities did not, however, inaugurate a new era of con-
sistent states' rights holdings by the Court, but was merely a first step in 
a new development which was still just in the bud. Nonetheless, in the 
course of the bicentennial year the Court passed several restrictive ver-
dicts in the area of federal protection of civil rights. In Washington v. 
Davis (1976) it reversed its course on racial discrimination in a voca-
tional context, requiiing proof of discriminatory intent rather than dis-
criminatory effect for a measure to be unconstitutional, which indicated a 
radical break with the Court 's liberal decision in Griggs v. Duke Power 
(1971). 12 In the area of redistricting, the Court's holding in Beer et al. v. 
12. Waslri11gto11 11. Davis, 426 U.S 229 (1 976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S 424 ( 197 J) . 
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United States (1976) represented a nanow reading of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 regarding federal requirements of redistricting plans.13 
However, in several decisions the Court did clarify its position with 
regard to congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In its unani-
mous decision in Hodel v. Virginia Su1face Mining & Reel. Assn. (1981), 
wri tten by Justice Thurgood Marshall , the Court established a three-
pronged test for such legislation. 14 First, there must be a showing that the 
challenged statute regulates the "States as States." Second, the federal 
regulation must address matters that are "indisputably attribute Is I of 
State sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' compli-
ance with federal law would directly impair their traditional govern-
mental fu nctions.15 These cri teria came to serve as a litmus test in future 
cases. 
The Pendulum Swings Back 
Eight years later the Court came very close to overruling its decision in 
National League of Cities, indicating that its holding in that case was 
insecure. In EEOC v. Wyoming (1983), Blackmun switched sides to sup-
port a 5-4 majority opinion penned by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 
holding as valid the reach of The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
of 1967 to cover state and local governments under the Commerce 
Clause. 16 Two years later the trend came full circle, in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Transit Authority. 17 Again Justice Blackmun provided the pivotal 
fifth vote for the Court's opinion, this time writing the opinion himself. In 
fact, by switchjng sides from his stance in National Leaf?ue of Cities, he 
single-handedly effected a U-turn by the Court on this issue, now explic-
itly overrul ing the National League decision: "This analysis makes clear 
that Congress' action in affording SAMTA !San Antonio Metropolitan 
13. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
14. 452 U.S. 264 ( 198 1). Although the Couii <lccision was unanimous, the Chief Justice and Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist felt the need to write separate concurrent opinions. 
15. Natio11al Leag11e of Cities 11. Usery, 426 U.S . 833, 852 (1976); Hodel, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 ( 198 1 ). 
16. 460 U.S. 226, 244 ( 1983). 
17. 469 U.S. 528 (1 985). 
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Transit Authorityl employees the protections of the wage and hour ... 
provisions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Congress ' 
power under the Commerce Clause." 18 
Pointing to hi s concurrence in The National League of Cities, Justice 
Blackmun admitted that the Court in that case had "underestimated the 
national political process for the continued vitality of the States," the 
Court in fact trying "to repair what did not need repair." What had caused 
him to change hi s view was the efforts by inferior courts to implement the 
Supreme Court's 1976 decision, which had "proven impracticable and 
doctrinally barren." The central point was the Court's attempt, in 
National League of Cities, to establish a distinction between those activi-
ties which were "traditional" tasks of city governments and operations 
which were not. This dividing line had proven untenable (ibid.). 
Sandra Day O'Connor 's spirited dissent was couched in a language 
fl avored by martial metaphors: "The Court today surveys the battlefield 
of federalism and sounds a retreat .. . I would prefer to hold the field 
and ... render a little aid to the wounded." Her criticism was primarily 
based on references to the Federalist Papers. The gist of her argument 
was clear: ''The true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States 
have legitimate interests which the national government is bound to 
respect even though its laws are supreme." 19 
O'Connor claimed that the powers delegated to the central government 
were "few and defined," and that the modern use of the commerce power 
had come to undermine the traditional concept of dual federalism. She 
deplored the development which had taken place in this area in recent 
decades, apparently seeing 1954 - the year of the major school desegre-
gation decision, Brown v. Board of Education - as an important milestone 
on this route: In 1954, the idea had still been alive that national action 
was exceptional, an intrnsion which was to be justified by some special 
necessity. She objected to the majority's equating the states with private 
litigants before the Court, emphasizing that the autonomy of a state is an 
essential constituent of federalism. Like Rehnquist, she was firm in her 
belief that the Court would "in time again assume its constitutional 
responsibility." 
18. Ibid. 555-556. 
19. l/Jid. 580-581. 
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Backlash 
The issue of age, which had been the pivotal point in E.E.O.C. v. 
\ifyom.ing (1983), was revived in Gregory v. Ashcroft (199 1), where the 
key issue was whether the federal Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA) applied to state judges. Article V, 26 of the Missomi 
Constitution had a mandatory retirement age for most state judges.20 The 
Court held , in an opinion by Justice O' Connor (5-4), that the Missouri 
law did not violate the ADEA nor the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment, since ADEA does not apply to appointed state judges.2 1 The 
Court skirted the constitutional issue by mooring its judgment in the 
"plain-statement" rule most recently articulated in Atascadero State Hos-
pital v. Scanlon (1985): "If Congress intends to alter the ' usual constitu-
tional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must 
make its intention to do so ' unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute. "'22 
The ruling was constitutionally anchored to the Guarantee Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 4): "The United States shall guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican form of Government." The Missouri law 
was held to "go to the heart of representative government," as a severe 
restriction of the Equal Protection Clause, according to the Court majority, 
which now adhered to the so-called political function argument. It is inter-
esting that the Court majority - which recently had been adamant about 
separating the courts from the legislative branch in other cases, had advo-
cated judicial restraint, and was allegedly wary of entering the "political 
thicket" - now accepted the argument by Missouri Governor John 
Ashcroft that a judge was an appointee at the policymaking level. The 
bottom line was, therefore, that the state judges were exempted and, con-
sequently, that the ADEA was severely curtailed in its reach. 
In the following term - in New York v. United States (1992) - the Court 
took a decisive retroactive quantum leap in its interpretation of feder-
alism.23 Apparently, Justice O' Connor now had her mind set on changing 
20. 501U.S.452 (199 1). 
21. The Equal Protection Clause reads: "[nor shall any Stale] ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." 
22. 473 U.S. 234, 242 ( 1985). 
23. 505 U.S. 144 ( 1992). This could be seen as a result of the addi tion to the hend1 of a staunch conserva-
tive states' rights proponent, Clarence Thomas, lo replace the liberal pro-federal government judge, Thurgood 
Marshall, who was still serving when Gregu1 y v. Ashcruj) was decided. 
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the course of post-WW II jurisprudence in the field of federalism. New 
York State had challenged the federal Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
Policy Amendments Act of 1985 regulating the operation of disposal sites 
for low-level radioactive waste. The Act contained three kinds of incen-
tives to encourage states to build receptacles for such waste: ( 1) monetary 
incentives, (2) access incentives, and (3) a take-title provision. Whereas 
the entire Court upheld the former two measures, the 5-4 conservative 
majority found the take-title provision unconstitutional. 
In short, the controversial measure specified that a state or a "regional 
compact" that failed to provide for the disposal of internally generated 
waste by a particular date "must take title to and possession of the 
waste . .. " (144). Justice O'Connor focused on the circumstances under 
which Congress may use states as implements of regulation. The Tenth 
Amendment occupied center stage in her analysis, which hinged on the 
question of state sovereignty. In her view there were two ways of vali-
dating an act of Congress in a case involving the division of authority 
between federal and state governments: Either it could be authorized as 
an expression of a power delegated to Congress under Article I of the 
Constitution (congressional powers), or the Court could determine to 
what extent it invaded "the province of state sovereignty reserved by the 
Tenth Amendment." The two sets of inquiries were "mirror images of 
each other": 
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether 
one views the question at issue in this case as one ascertaining the limits of the power 
delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative powers of the Constitution 
or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth 
Amendment. ( 159) 
O'Connor admitted that the relationship between state and federal 
powers had changed in favor of the latter, especially under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, but she claimed that the constitutional structure 
underlying and limiting that authority had not. 24 Here she seemed to erect 
a wall of separation between two watertight compmtments, as it were, 
24. Art. I, Section 8, reads in part: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the forego ing Powers ... " This clause is generally known as the "Necessary and Proper 
Clause," but it is also called the "Flexibility Clause" because of its wide applicability. 
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leaving little room for overlap of authority. However, her key point is 
whether an incident of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment rep-
resents a limitation on an Article I power. O'Connor argued by analogy 
that, although Congress may regulate publishers engaged in interstate 
commerce, it is constrained by the First Amendment guarantee of the 
freedom of speech. The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains federal 
power, said O'Connor, adding an interesting qualification to her state-
ment for an allegedly strict constructionist, "but this limit is not derived 
from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which , as we have dis-
cussed, ... is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment con-
firms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that 
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States" (157) . 
O 'Connor furthermore saw the take-title provision as different from 
the other incentives. Whether one considers the take-title provision as 
lying outside Congress' enumerated powers or as infringing upon the 
core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, she found 
the provision inconsistent with the federal structure of government estab-
lished by the Constitution. Unlike the other incentives, it did not repre-
sent the conditional exercise of any congressional power enumerated in 
the Constitution. Instead, the Act simply "conunandeer[ed] the legisla-
tive processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and 
enforce a federal regulatory program," O'Connor observed, quoting for 
support the Court in Hodel v. Virginia SUJ:face Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., Inc.25 
O'Connor was willing to grant Congress considerable power to regu-
late matters directly in re lation to individual citizens and also to preempt 
contrary state regulation, but not to regulate states as states or compel 
states to legislate. Here she resorted to the Federalist Papers to bolster 
her bottom line, in keeping with much of her analysis, which for a great 
part relied on pre-constitutional original-intent arguments: 
States are not mere pol itical subdivisions of the U nited States. State governments arc 
neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government. The 
positions occupied by slate officials appear nowhere on the Federal Government's most 
detailed organizational chart. The Constitution instead " leaves to the several States a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 246 (C. Rossiter ed. 
J 96 l ), reserved explic itly to the States by the Tenth Amendment. ( 188) 
25. 176-177; 452 U.S. 264, 288 ( 198 1). 
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In his long dissent, Justice White took an unkind view of O'Connor 's 
factual account of the case, pointing out that the federal government 
had, in a considerable degree, left to the states to work out plans for dis-
posal of this dangerous waste by way of cooperation. In fact, the J 985 
Act was a clear-cut issue of cooperative federalism in which the states 
had bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress 
to sanction, White contended: "Unlike legislation that djrects action 
from the Federal Government to the States, the 1980 and 1985 Acts 
reflected hard-fought agreements among States as refereed by 
Congress" (194) . White was troubled by the majority's "rule and illog-
ical distinction in the types of alleged incursions on state sovereignty," 
which he contended were not supported by the cases referred to in the 
majority's analysis. It was primarily the Court's distinction between the 
federal statute 's regulation of states and private parties - as opposed to 
a regulation solely of state activities - that he found "unsupported by 
[the Court's] recent Tenth Amendment cases." He could hardly fi nd any 
trace of this distinction in the "spirited exchange" between the Court 
majority and the dissenters in National League of Cities or Garcia. In 
fact, he claimed that in "no case has the Court rested its holding on such 
a distinction" (202, 201 ). 
Criticizing the Court's reliance on Hodel and FERC for support of its 
thesis regarding the "commandeering principle" - which in fact meant 
hitching it to "a solitary statement in dic tum" in the former case - White 
reminded the Court that "just last Term . . . JUSTICE O'CONNOR wrote 
for the Court that ' [w Je are constrained in our ability to consider the 
limits that the state-federal balance places on Congress' power under the 
Commerce Clause."26 And for good measure he quoted more of the 
Court 's holding in Garcia, the case that he saw as obviously controlling 
in this instance: 
fWc] are convinced that ... the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme 
imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one of process, 
rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of the Commerce 
26. Gregm)' v. Ashcmft, 50 1 U.S. 452, 464 ( 1991 ), refcning to Garcia, 528. One can detecl a similar 
change in O'Connor 's posi1ion in affirmative action cases, where she, in City uf Rich111011d \\ J.t\. Croson Co .. 
488 U.S. 469 {I 989) had admitted special congressional powers - beyond those of stale and local govern-
ments - under § 5 of the 14'" Amendment, which she snapped away in Adara11d Co11str11ctiun Co. v. Pena, 1 15 
S. Ct. 2097 (1995), placing Congress on a par with state governments also in this regmd. 
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Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limita-
tion, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible fa ilings in the national political 
process, rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy." (206) 
Strangely enough, White 's most fundamental cn t1c1sm of the Court 's 
opinion was buried in a footnote. Here he took the Court majority to 
task for its selective use of precedent, in particular its pre-Civil War 
emphasis at the expense of the virtual revolutions which had taken place 
after the Civil War and in the wake of the New Deal , stating that "the 
Court's civics lecture has a hollow ring at a time when action, rather 
than rhetoric, is needed to solve a national problem." In fact, he was 
saying that the Court was turning the clock back, neglecting the modern 
development of federa lism; that is, the Court's stance was outri ght reac-
tionary: 
With selective quotations from the era in which the Constitution was adopted, Lhe majo-
rity atte mpts to bolster its holding that the take title provis ion is tantamount to federal 
"commandeering" of the States . . . . l do not read the majority's many invocations of 
his tory to be anything other than elaborate window dressing. Certainly nowhere does 
the majority announce that its rule is compelled by an understanding of what the Fra-
mers may have thought about statutes of the type at issue here. Moreover, J would 
observe that, wh ile its quotations add a certain flavor to the opinion, the majority's 
historical analysis has a distinctly wooden quality. One would not know from reading 
the majority 's account, for instance, that the nature of federal-state relations changed 
fundamentally after tJ1e Civil War. That conflict produced in its wake a tremendous 
expansion in the scope of the Federal Government's lawmaking authority, so much so 
that the persons who helped to found the Republic would scarcely have recognized the 
many added roles the National Government assumed for itself. Moreover, the majority 
fails to mention the New Deal era, in which the Court recognized the enormous growth 
in Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. (207, n. 3) 
In his brief dissenting statement, Justice Stevens was similarly critical of 
the Court's constitutional historiography. Contrary to the majority 's inter-
pretation of the Constitution in a confederate direction, he pointed to the 
clear expansion of federal power under the Constitution compared to its 
function under the Articles of Confederation: "Nothing in the history sug-
gests that the Federal Goverrunent may not also impose its will upon the 
several States as it did under the Articles. The Constitution enhanced, 
rather than diminished, the power of the Federal Government." He went 
so far as to hold that even if the Act had not been passed, the Court would 
have power to command a state to take remedial action if its radioactive 
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waste created a nuisance to another state, adding an interesting categor-
ical punch line: "If this Court has such authority, surely Congress has 
similar authority. "27 
Aggressive Court Activism 
In 1995 another controversial case involving federal authority under the 
Commerce Clause was brought before the Court. The question addressed 
in United States v. Lopez (1995) involved the Gun-Free Schoo] Zones Act 
of 1990, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at 
a place that the individual knows, or has cause to believe, is a school 
zone ... "Chief Justice Rehnquist held, for a five-fom majority, that "the 
Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement 
that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce" and 
thus exceeded the authority of Congress to regulate "Commerce ... 
among the several States .. . "28 
Rehnquist noted the high degree of deference to Congress implied in 
the previous decisions by the Court, whose track record he thought 
amounted to the virtual establishment of a federal police power of the 
kind reserved to the states. In the broad language of these opinions he 
sensed a possibility of additional expansion. To accept this development 
would be to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers 
"does not presuppose something not enumerated ... and that there never 
will be any distinction between what is truly national and what is truly 
local" (19). In particular, he emphasized what he saw as a tenuous link 
between gun control and commerce, and in his opinion the acceptance of 
this Act would establish a full-fl edged federal police power in areas out-
side its enumerated powers. By finding the Act unconstitutional, Rehn-
quist signaled a decisive and new curtailment of congressional powers 
under the Commerce Clause. 
27. Ibid. 2 11 , 2 13. 
28. U11ited States v. Lopez, No. 93- 1260. Rehnquist's majority opinion was supported by Justices 
O ' Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, the latter two also writing separate opinions, O'Connor joining that 
of Kennedy. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer wrote dissenting opinions, the former two also joining that 
of the latter, along wi th Ginsburg. 
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In some ways reminiscent of Justice Blackmun's brief concuning note 
in National League o.f' Cities (1976), Justice Kennedy felt a need to write 
a separate opinion to qualify his consent to Rehnquist's statement for the 
Cowt. He emphasized the monumental changes in the Court's perception 
of the Commerce Clause from Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United 
States (1911), through the New Deal decisions, 1937-1942, and their 
progeny down to Perez v. United States (1971 ): "These and like authori-
ties are within the fair ambit of the Court's practical conception of com-
mercial regulation and are not called into question by our decision 
today." He then further stated explicitly that "Congress can regulate in 
the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market 
and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy" (Kennedy 7, 
8). 
However, having made these concessions to federa l authority, 
Kennedy observed that of the fundamental structural elements in the 
Constitution - separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial 
review, and federalism - only concerning the last link in the chain does 
there seem to be "much uncertainty respecting the existence, and the con-
tent, of standards that allow the judiciary to play a significant role in 
maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers." He found this 
somewhat ironic since federalism was the "unique contribution of the 
Framers to political science and political theory. " This principle was 
established to serve freedom, said Kennedy, seeing in federalism clear 
evidence of the profound insight of the Framers: "In the compound 
republic of America, power surrendered by the people is firs t divided 
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments" (9). 
Whereas Kennedy's concmTence was moderate, apparently seeking to 
walk the line between post-New Deal jmisprudence regarding the Com-
merce Clause and the more radical view espoused by the Chief Justice, 
Justice Clarence Thomas' concurrence was, in contrast, a programmatic 
exercise in judicial activism based on the doctrine of original intent: 
Although l join the majority, T write separately to observe that our case law has drifted 
far from the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. Jn a future case, we ought 
to temper our Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of 
our more recent case law and is more faithful to the original understanding of that 
Clause. (Thomas l) 
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Justice Thomas' statement in Lopez was reminiscent of his marathon con-
cmTency in the redistricting case Halder v. Hall (1994) -his conservative 
legal manifesto of sorts - in which he had been wil1ing to dismiss 
decades of precedents in the Court's record of redistricting decisions: "In 
my view, our current practice should not continue. Not for another Term, 
not until the next case, not for another day."29 In that case Justice Stevens 
had dryly dismissed Justice Thomas' long-winded exposition in an 
almost overbearing manner: "It is therefore inappropriate for me to com-
ment on portions of ... his opinion that are best described as an argument 
that the statute be repealed or amended in important respects."30 
Basing most of his arguments on an original-intent defense - the Fed-
eralist Papers and very early Court decisions - Justice Thomas was not 
shy about placing a tall order: "My review of the case law indicates that 
the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century."31 Fur-
thermore, he took Breyer to task for allegedly misinterpreting Gibbons v. 
Ogden (1824), which meant that Thomas was willing to take on a consid-
erable chain of precedents, a position which does not seem to square too 
well with his claim to judicial restraint and deference to the political 
branch frequently paraded in his opinions. Thomas stated point-blank 
that the federal government has no authority to regulate within the fi eld 
of reserved powers, its domain being limited to those powers surrendered 
to it by the states. Admitting "that many believe that it is too late in the 
day to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60 years," he 
nonetheless announced: "In an appropriate case, I believe that we must 
further reconsider our 'substantial effects' test with an eye toward con-
structing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce 
Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce clause 
jurisprudence. "32 
Symptomatically, none of the dissents addressed Thomas' arguments 
at all. In his brief, separate opinion, Justice Stevens underlined his agree-
ment with Breyer's interpretation of the legal problem at issue, but felt a 
need to add a paragraph on congressional authority in this area, which 
29. Hairier F. Hall, No.9 1-2012 (1994), 30 of 46. 
30. Holder v. Hall, 46. 
31. Thomas 14. The "substantial economic effect" lest was developed most explicitly by Justice Holmes in 
the so-called Shreveport Rate Case, Houston E. and W Texas Railway Co v. U.S. , 234 U.S. 342 ( I 9 I 4). 
32. Thomas 18, fn. 8; Thomas 2. 
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ended in this matter-of-fact observation: "Whether or not the national 
interest in eliminating that market [for gun providers] would have justi-
fied federal legislation in 1789, it surely does today" (Stevens 2). 
Justice Souter, in his dissent, started by reminding the Court that defer-
ence to rationally based legislative judgments "is a paradigm of judicial 
restraint" (Souter 1 ). Referring to the pre-New Deal period of judicial 
activism in the Court's hi story, which he characterized as "an untenably 
expansive conception of judicial review," Souter admonished the Court 
to adhere to "the modern respect for the competency and primacy of 
Congress in matters affecting commerce developed only after one of the 
Court's most chastening experiences." Souter pointed to the momentous 
significance of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, which had opened 
up a new age of congressional reliance on the Commerce Clause for 
authority to exercise general police powers at the national level. He saw 
the twentieth-century record of the Court in this area of law prior to 1937 
as an era little worthy of praise, a period when the Court based its deci-
sions on "highly formalistic notions of 'commerce' to invalidate federal 
social and economic legislation." Revisiting the Court's famili ar distinc-
tion between manufacturing and commerce by recounting a series of 
decisions reflecting the Court 's substantive due process activi sm, Souter 
underscored the point that it was not merely coincidental that the "sea 
changes" in the Comt's conceptions of its authmity under the Due Pro-
cess and Commerce Clauses had occurred virtually together, in the year 
1937. This event had signaled a switch away from the Court 's prior 
reliance on laissez-faire ideology, pegged to the Contract Clause of the 
Constitution, to a modern perception of congressional authority required 
to meet the overarching constitutional duty to "promote the general wel-
fare . "33 The rational basis review standard had reigned supreme 
throughout all those years following the famous "switch." It was Souter 's 
fear that this practice was now being undermined by the Court majority; 
he saw the Court's di stinction between what was "patently commercial 
and what is not" as disconcertingly similar to the former distinction 
between what affects commerce directly and indirectly, respectively 
33. Souter 3, 4. This duty of the fcdernl government is explicitly expressed in The Preamble of the U.S. 
Conslilulion. Tn addition, Ari. I, Section 8, charges Congress specifically with the duty to "provide for the .. . 
general Welfare of the United States." 
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(which might be seen as an updated version of the manufacture vs. com-
merce polarity, as it were). 
Souter's chief concern was to distinguish statement rules applied in 
statute interpretation to establish congressional intent, when this was not 
clearly expressed, from the question of standard of judicial review: 
"Indeed , to allow our hesitance to affect the standard of review would 
inevitably degenerate into the kind of substantive policy review that the 
Court found indefensible 60 years ago" (9): 
But review for congressional wisdom would just be the old judicial pretension discre-
dited and abandoned in 1937, and review for deliberateness would be as patently 
unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court. Such 
a legislative process requirement would func tion mainly as an excuse for covert review 
of the merits of legislation under standards never expressed and more or less arbitrarily 
applied. Under such a regime, in any case, the rationality standard of review would be 
a thing of the past. (I 2) 
Exit Stare Decisis? 34 
Justice Breyer's appended a 17-page list of literature to support his dis-
sent. In his view, the Court's "critical distinction between 'commercial ' 
and noncommercial ' transactionrs] "' would mean that there is a distinc-
tion between two local activities - "each of which has an identical effect 
on interstate commerce" - if one is deemed commercial and the other is 
not. He rejected this position on the basis of the warning sounded in 
Wickard v. Filburn (1942) not to turn questions of congressional power 
upon formulas which would give "controlling force to nomenclature such 
as 'production ' and 'indirect' and foreclose consideration of the actual 
effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce."35 
The Court's undermining of a legal field which "until this case, [had] 
seemed reasonably well settled," could put in jeopardy more than 100 
sections of the U.S. Code - including at least 25 criminal statutes - which 
use the phrase "affecting commerce" to define their scope (17). Thus, 
Breyer saw the Court's decision as a very serious violation of the stare 
34. Stare decisis - "let the decision stand" - to abide by, o r adhere lo decided cases, i.e. follow precedent. 
35. Wickwd v. Fi/born, 317 U.S. 111, at 120 (1942); Lopez, Breyer 14, 15. 
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decisis principle. Upholding the Act under scmtiny would "interpret the 
Clause as this Court ha[d] traditionally interpreted it, with the exception 
of one wrong turn [National League of Cities v. Usery (1976)] subse-
quently corrected."36 In short, Breyer and his supporters rejected - as a 
severe break with constitutional traditions long established - the judicial 
activism introduced in this area by the Court majority and its return to a 
pre-New Deal line of reasoning. 
In the succeeding term, another aspect of congressional authority to 
regulate commerce - the so-called Indian Commerce Clause - came 
under Court scrutiny in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida et al. 
(1996).37 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) had been passed by 
Congress to serve as a s tatutory basis for the operation and regulation of 
Indian gambling activities, which had spread like wildfire in recent 
years.38 The Act authorized tribes to sue states in federal courts in order to 
compel state compliance with the Act by ente1ing good-faith negotiation 
with the tribes. Florida had not done so, nor had the state consented to be 
sued. The principal issue to be resolved was to what extent a state is 
immune from such suits under the 11th Amendment, and the subsidiary 
question to be answered was the reach of the Indian Commerce Clause in 
light of the Court's perception of the former question.39 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the majmity, revisited the Court's 1989 decision in 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. , which had in effect upheld the right of 
Congress to abrogate the states' 11 th Amendment immunity pursuant to 
its power under the (Interstate) Commerce Clause.40 
In Pennsylvania, Justice Byron White had provided the fifth vote for 
Justice Brennan 's majority opinion judgment, but had atTived at that con-
clusion by reasoning which was at variance with that of the Brennan plu-
36. Dreyer also bolstered hi s opinio 11 with a reforence to Justice Holmes' statement in Swiji & Co. v. 
United Swtes ( 1905) that Congress should be pcrmillcd "lo act in terms of economic ... realities."Sw(ft & Co. 
v. United States, J 96 U.S . 375, 398 ( 1905), quoted in North !1111erican Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 ( 1946); 
Lopez 18. 
37. 5 17 U.S. 44 (1996). The so-called Indian Commerce Clause is the last segment of the Commerce 
Clause. 
38. 25 uses 2701 et seq. 
39. The l lth Amendment states: 'The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against o ne of the United Stales hy Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." 
40. 491 U.S . I ( 1989). 
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rality. This fact was made a central point in Rehnqui st's opinion, which 
expressly overruled Union Gas Co. The Rehnquist majority admitted the 
clear intent of Congress in IGRA to abrogate the states' sovereign immu-
nity, but held that the Indian Commerce Clause did not authorize 
Congress to curtail the states' sovereign immunity. In short, although 
Article I grants Congress total authority to regulate commerce, the 11111 
Amendment acts as a limit on its power to abrogate state immunity 
because Article 11 I limits the authority of federal courts to allow a tribe to 
sue a state in federal court (20). Consequently, IGRA could not grant 
jurisdiction over a state that did not consent to suit. Furthermore, by 
adopting what would appear to becircular argumentation, the Chief Jus-
tice stated that the age-old doctrine of Ex Parte Young ( 1908) - which 
had been a federal tool to get at states which violated federal law, by 
going after state employees - could not be used because the federal gov-
ernment had provided an elaborate scheme for enforcement under 
TGRA.41 
The Chief Justice rested his case heavily on a more than one-hundred-
year-old controversial decision by the Court, Hans v. Louisiana (1890), 
which in his view clearly established the doctrine of state immunity from 
suit.42 With regard to the principle of precedent, Rehnquist stated that the 
Court had always treated stare decisis as a "principle of policy .. . and not 
as an 'inexorable command,"' articulating clearly his justification for 
overriding precedent: "When governing decisions arc unworkable or 
badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow prece-
dent. "'43 
Although Justice Stevens endorsed Justice Souter's dissenting opinion 
- describing it as a "strikingly uniform scholarly commentary" - he felt a 
need to write a separate dissent because of "the shocking character of the 
majority's affront to the coequal branch of our Government" (Stevens 1). 
In fact, said Stevens, the issue before the court had been "addressed 
squarely by a total of 13 Justices, 8 of whom cast their votes with the so-
called ' plurality"' (20). The consequences of the Court majority's deci-
41. Ex Pane Yo1111g, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Se111i110/e, 47. 
42. 134 U.S. ! ( 1890). Souter, in his dissent, d issected the Hans decision carefully, sa lvaging the parts he 
found useful and thus upholding it in a reverent bow to the principle or stare decisis. 
43. Rehnquist here cited Payne v. Te1111essee, 501 U.S. 808 at 828, 827 ( 1991 ) and Smi1/i '" Allwrighl, 32 1 
U.S . 649, 665 ( 1944). Se111i110/e, I 8. 
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sion to overrule Union Gas could not be overstated, said Stevens, who 
saw this as a sharp break with the past: "This is a case about power - the 
power of the Congress of the United States to create a private federal 
cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a fed-
eral right." Even Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 
which provided the blueprint for the 11 th Amendment, "assumed that 
Congress had such power" (1). His main point of attack, however, was on 
the majority's reliance on a common law traditional background which 
he did not at all consider a bona fide part of the constitutional framework. 
In an unusually extensive and detailed analysis of the historical context, 
Justice Stevens emphasized that the Court, both in Chisholm v. Georgia 
and Hans. v. Louisiana, had ascertained that federal courts possessed 
only such jurisdiction as Congress had provided and that the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 did not extend to suits against un-consenting states, not that 
Article III did not authorize such extension. 
Justice Souter similarly observed that "the Court today holds for the 
first time since the founding of the Republic that Congress has no 
authority to subject a State to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the 
behest of an individual asserting a federal right" (Souter I ). He also 
emphasized the majority's admission that the Court, in Hans v. 
Louisiana, had had no occasion to decide whether Congress cou ld abro-
gate a State's immunity from federal question sui ts (26). He further dis-
puted Rehnquist's historical rendition of the Court's J 1th Amendment 
interpretation in favor of state immunity. Since the Hans Court had held 
such suit to be barred by "a nonconstitutional common-law immunity," 
the modern Court had- rightly, in his view - ignored the post-Hans dicta 
in that sort of cases and exercised the jurisdiction that the plain text of 
Article Ill provides (27, 31). 
Souter offertd a broad and thorough, longitudinal analysis of the status 
of common law in an American context and was in full agreement with 
Stevens regarding its inapplicability within a constitutional framework. 
Basing his conclusion on a broad survey of w1itings by the Founders and 
by authoritative constitutional scholars and Court records, Justice Souter 
passed a harsh judgment on the majority's verdict: 
Thus, the Court's attempt to convert isolated statements by the Framers into answers to 
questions not before them is fundamenta lly misguided.42 The Court's difficulty is far 
more fundamental, however, than inconsistency with a particular quotation, for the 
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Court's position runs afoul of the general theory of sovereignty Lhat gave shape to the 
Framers' experience. An inquiry into the devclopmenl of that concept demonstrates that 
American political thought had so revolutionized the concept of sovereignty itself that 
call ing for the immunity of a State as against the jurisdiction of the national courts 
would have been sheer il logic.44 
The Commerce Clause Revised and Diversified 
The Court majority seemed to be eagerly looking for a case which could 
extend further its new doctrine of the narrow reach of the Commerce 
Clause and the solidity of the 11111 Amendment bar against federal 
powers. Prinz v. United States (1996) appeared to offer such an opportu-
nity. The key question in this case was whether Congress, by imposing an 
interim burden on Jocal chief legal executive officers under the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act to perform a background check on 
prospective gun purchasers, was overreaching its authority under the 
Commerce Clause. 4s 
The battle lines drawn up in the preceding cases reappeared. In his 
concurrency, Justice Thomas ceremoniously reiterated his call in United 
States v. Lopez for a total revision of the Court's post-New Deal line of 
decisions based on the Commerce Clause. Writing the opinion of the 
Court, Justice Scali a focused on the Supremacy Clause 's explicit mention 
of judges, thus setting them aside from members of the executive and 
legislative branches of the states. Again he emphasized the voluntary 
nature of the states' need to implement federal laws, among other argu-
ments hinging his case on President Wilson's "requesting" rather than 
"commandeering" the collaboration of state governors to implement his 
44. Seminole, 53-54. (Foo1note 42 reads: Sec '/11e Federalist No. 82, at 553 (A. Hamilton) (disclaiming 
any intent 10 answer all lhe "questions of intricacy and nicety" arising in a judicial sys1em that must accom-
modate "the total or partial incorporation of a number o f d istinct sovereignties"); S. Elkins and E. McKitrick, 
The Age of Federalism 64 ( 1993) [New York: Oxford University Press] (suggesting that "[tjhe amount of 
allcntion and d iscussio n given to the judiciary in the Constitutional Convention was on ly a fractio n of that 
devoted to the executive and legislative b ranches," and that the Framers deliberately le ft many questions open 
for later resolution)}. 
45. Prinz., Slieriff/Cnm11e1; Navia/Ii County, Mo11ta11a v. United Stares (1996); No. 95- 1478. This tem-
porary d uty imposed on local officials by The Brady Act ( 1993) was a tide-over provision while a national 
instant background check system was being de veloped, to be in place on Nov. 30, 1998. 
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selective draft law during WW I. Many of the arguments of the majority 
in New York v. United States were restated by Scalia in Prinz. The dis-
sent's attempt to distinguish Prinz from New York by arguing that in the 
former case the act was aimed at individual state officials - not states as 
states - was rejected by Scalia as an interpretation that "disembowels" 
the verdict in the latter case, and hence the Eleventh Amendment (11). 
His concluding statement reads : 
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a 
federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohi-
bition by conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Government may 
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particu lar problems, nor com-
mand the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program. Tt matters not whether policymaking is involved, 
and no case by case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands 
are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty ... 
(12) 
Stevens, writing the four-member dissent, objected vehemently to the 
majority 's narrow reading of the Supremacy Clause and statutes where 
the federal government was relying on state judges and their clerks to 
caJTy out federal tasks, pointing out that judges historically performed 
many characteristically executive functions - and still do to some extent 
- that executive agencies would otherwise cmTy out. However, Stevens' 
major attack on the Court's opinion was that it was lacking in the affir-
mative and was basically made up of responses to the dissent's arguments 
and also relied heavily on dicta, thus Jacking in positive constitutional 
authority: "Absent even a modicum of textual foundation for its judi-
cially crafted constitutional rule, there should be a presumption that if the 
Framers had actually intended such a rule, at least one of them would 
have mentioned it" (19). And, admittedly, Scalia's opinion has a number 
of vague formulations and partial concessions which are somewhat atyp-
ical of his generally cocksure manner of writing. 
In his brief separate dissent, Justice Breyer interpreted the paucity of 
precedents to indicate a scant need for pronouncements in this field and 
argued that the Court should therefore adhere to its modern line of deci-
sions, thus defeJTing to precedence. Souter, in his dissent, relied on origi-
nalist support, referring to The Federalist Nos. 27, 36, 44, and 45, thus 
leaning on both Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. State officials 
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are bound by their oath of office to the U.S. Constitution to have "an 
essential agency in giving effect to the Federal Constitution," the former 
designating the state agency an "auxiliary" which "will be incorporated" 
into the nation's operation.46 
The next stage in the Court's process of redoing the Constitution 
offered itself in United States v. Morrison et al. (2000) , which involved a 
rape case from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute under the Violence 
against Women Act, which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims 
of gender-motivated violence.47 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the 
opinion of the Court (5-4) majority. Basing its holding on its reasoning in 
Lopez, the Court again addressed the question of whether this crime 
"substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce." In Lopez, Justice 
Kennedy had held that the Court's decision did not alter its "practical 
conception of commercial regulation" and that the link between gun 
ownership and "a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenu-
ated" (6, 7) . 
Jn contrast to Lopez, however, Morrison provided ample support of the 
claim that gender-motivated violence substantially affected interstate 
commerce. However, introducing Lopez as the new constitutional 
authority, Rehnquist now stated that "Congress' findings are substantially 
weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning 
that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the 
Constitution's enumeration of powers," thus rejecting more than half a 
century of Court holdings in this area, the Court now in fact substituting 
its new doctrine for more than five decades of progressive jmisprudence 
in the field (7). 
In his dissent, Justice Souter took exception to the Court's arguments, 
claiming that the Court's "nominal adherence to the substantial effects 
test is merely that" and that the Court in fact was supplanting rational 
analysis with a new criterion of review. He identified this new turn of 
events as having started in Lopez and now being extended by a "self-ful-
filling prophecy" in Morrison. This also meant power-grabbing on the 
part of the Court - in stark contrast to its claim of upholding the separa-
tion of powers - since the majority here had introduced a new "method of 
46. Madison, The Federalist No. 44, 307; Hamilton , No. 27, 175; Printz, 24. 
47. 42 U.S.C. §13981. 
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reasoning" based on "a uniquely judicial competence" (16). Souter 
rejected vehemently the Court's claim that the enumeration of powers 
implies that certain categories of subject matter are beyond the reach of 
the Commerce Clause, as a non sequitur to its correct observation that 
some powers are withheld by the states. The consequence of the Court's 
position was a limitation of Congress' power to regulate commerce by 
effectively abandoning the "substantial effects" test. In so doing, Souter 
claimed, the Court was reaching back to the line of reasoning employed 
by the Court prior to NLRB v. Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937), with its for-
malistic distinction between "manufacturing" and "commerce," etc.48 
Moreover, Souter saw the Court's "effort to carve out inviolable state 
spheres" within the spectrum of activities substantially affecting com-
merce as incompatibl e with Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), thus undermining 
the majority's 01iginal-intent argument.49 Tying his opinion to the New 
Deal "switch in time" decision, Souter stated: "The federa lism of some 
earlier time is no more adequate to account for those facts today than the 
theory of laissez-faire was able to govern the national economy 70 years 
ago," a reference back to Justice Holmes famous dissent in Lochner v. 
New York (1905) about the relevance of Herbert Spencer's theories 
known as social Darwinism.50 
Likewise, Justice Breyer pointed out that all the way since its decision 
in NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Cmp. ( 1937) the Court had held that 
"only the interstate commercial effects, not the local nature of the cause, 
are constitutionally relevant" (Breyer 23). Lopez represented a break with 
this line, said Breyer, by introducing a novel concept, placing critical 
constitutional weight upon "a different, less obviously relevant feature 
(how 'economic' it is)." He dismissed the Court's method of separating 
the state and federal spheres as under-inclusive and claimed that it would 
be impossible for the courts to develop "meaningful subject-matter cate-
gories" that would exclude certain areas from congressional control 
without vitally maiming the Commerce Clause as a regulatory tool. He 
48. U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I ( 1895); ill re Huff; 197 U.S. 488 (1 905): Adain•. U.S. 208 U.S. 161 
( 1908); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 ( 19 18); Schechter Po11/t1y Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 ( 1935); 
Morrison, 17- 18. 
49. 22 U.S.! (1824)[9 Wheat, J97 j. 
50. Printz, 2 1. In Lochner, I Iolmcs had stated: "The l 411' Amendment does not enact Mr. Spencer's Social 
Statics," l I of 12. 
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laid thi s authority at the door of Congress, which is charged with the 
responsibility of protecting states' rights, citing The Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act of 1995 as proof of the viability of "cooperative federalism" 
on this point. Thus, he not so indirectly accused the Court majority of 
judicial activism, contrary to its often-repeated claim to the contrary.51 
A Political Agenda? 
The claim that more factors than meet the eye may go into the Justices ' 
considerations of principles when deciding cases seemed to be borne out 
in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran et al. (2002), involving the ques-
tion whether the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) preempts the Illinois HMO Act. This was really a test case of 
the states' right to pass patients' bill of rights statutes; some forty-two 
states had done so, and lllinois and Texas had encountered conflicting 
Appeals Courts verdicts. The Rush case involved a patient who had 
sought alternative surgical treatment after her HMO had failed to provide 
a review of its denial of such treatment, a requirement prescribed in the 
Hlinois HMO Act. 
What was particularly intriguing in this case was the seemingly tables-
turned position held by the liberal and conservative factions of the 
Supreme Court. An uncommon constellation of votes appeared: The most 
fervent defenders of states' rights - the Chief Justice, Thomas, Scalia, 
and Kennedy - supported an opinion penned by Justice Thomas arguing 
that ERISA did preempt the field, whereas O'Connor joined the tradi-
tional defenders of the federal government's right to regulate in such mat-
ters in holding that it did not.52 
Jn his dissent, Thomas claimed that by enacting ERISA, Congress had 
provided an exclusive remedy, which preempted state remedies in the 
51. Breyer supported his argument on this point by several references to constitutional scholars, for 
example: Vicki Jackson, "Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Princ iple'!" Hwwml Law 
Revieiv J 11 (1998): 2180, 223 1-2245; Stephen Gardhaum, "Rethinking Constitutional Federal ism," Texas 
Law Revie•v 74 ( 1996): 795, 812-828, 830-832. 
52. The states' rights argument of the majority takes on a somewhat strange color when one is reminded 
I hat 36 states had written amici curiae briefs in support of the Act. 
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same field: "Such exclusivity of remedies is necessary to further 
Congress' intent in establishing a uniform federal law of employee bene-
fits so that employers are encouraged to provide benefits to their 
employees. To require plan providers to design their programs in an 
environment of differing state regulations would complicate the admini s-
tration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers 
might offset with decreased benefits."53 This argument smacks suspi-
ciously of policy-making, which Thomas is wont to abhor as a Court 
exercise and has traditionally assigned to the sphere of legislators. The 
dissenters' position in this case seems out of character in that it departs 
from the persistent devolutionary line of decisions by the majority -
which has regarded the states as experimental laboratories within the fed-
eral system - and may be seen as evidence of its pro-business leaning. 
Justice Souter's opinion for the majority offered a Court record of case 
hi story in this obscure area of law which was radically at variance with 
that presented by Thomas. His main point was that the HMO Act of 1973 
established HM Os as a new kind of health care delivery system, and that 
" the very text of the Act" assumes that state insurance laws will apply to 
HMOs and that "ERlSA's mandate that 'nothing in this subchapter shall 
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any State which regu-
lates insurance,' ... ostensibly forecloses preemption" (6). Consequently, 
Souter considered the majority's interpretation to represent the consistent 
line taken by the Court previously, thus observing the rule of stare decisis. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of the above, it can be safely asserted that by the time the 
Rehnquist Comt closed its first session in the new millennium, it had 
come a long way towards restoring the Tenth Amendment to significance, 
had revital ized the Eleventh Amendment and made it into a bastion of 
state sovereignty, and had curtailed the reach of the Commerce Clause so 
as to severely maim it as a plenary power repository for Congress. I 
would argue that the Court had in fact carried out a constitutional rewrite. 
53. FMC Corp. '" l·lolliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 ( 1990) ( 13 of24). 
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In so doing, the Court had demonstrated a consistent line of judicial 
activism, enhancing the role of the Court at the expense of Congress, on 
the one hand - thus upsetting the checks and balances at the federal level 
- and, on the other, promoting the powers of the states in relation to the 
federal government, thus tilting the vertical balance of power. 
Beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court had been quite persistent in its 
activism since its ideoJogical balance had tilted decidedly to the conser-
vative side by the arrival of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy in February of 
1988, establishing a stable conservative majority in most areas of 
jurisprudence. This conservative bloc has been accused by critics of judi-
cial activism of the kind the bloc rejects in its rhetoric - amounting to a 
rewriting the Constitution - which is lawmaking plain and simple. Its 
decision in Rush seems to support this criticism. TraditionaDy the federal 
government has been more liberal in most areas of law, and by shifting 
the balance of power to the states a conservative agenda, including a pro-
business position, has been served. In Rush, however, the state law was 
more liberal that the federal - that is, less protective of business interests 
- and therefore the minority's pro-business stance may have taken the 
upper hand. Obviously, although conservative in its political leaning, in 
legal terms the Court has cut a clearly radical track record by what some 
critics call its "reactionary" decisions. 
This discrepancy between preaching and practicing is also apparent in 
its general rhetoric - in which there is a considerable portion of 
"newspeak," to use an Orwellian term - a practice it shares with the 
entire conservative movement in contemporary American society. Terms 
such as "liberty," "equality," "color-blindness," and "the four corners of 
the statute" have taken on new meanings in these new political environs. 
With like-minded people in control of all three branches of government, 
the scene is set for U1e conclusion of a broad-based political and constilu-
tional revolution that may put its stamp on the life of the nation for years 
to come. The appointment of one or two young members of the Supreme 
Court by the incumbent president could preserve the end result of this 
metamorphosis of the American political system for a very long time.54 
54. The struggles over confirmation of federal judges in the Senate in recent years are well described in 
Herman Schwa11z's recent book, Right Wing Justice: The Conservative Campaign to Take Over the Co 11rls 
(New York: Nation Books, 2004). 
